State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982) arose in the backdrop of the large-scale reorganisation of States carried out in India through the States Reorganisation Act, 1956.
This Act was enacted under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution and was intended to permanently restructure State boundaries and administrative arrangements, including the organisation of High Courts.
The legislation was not a temporary or transitory enactment but a comprehensive statutory framework designed to address continuing administrative and judicial needs following reorganisation.
Before 1956, the Bombay High Court exercised jurisdiction over a vast territory comprising present day Maharashtra, Gujarat, parts of Madhya Pradesh, and the Marathwada region of the former Hyderabad State.
With the formation of the bilingual State of Bombay under section 8 of the States Reorganisation Act, the High Court’s jurisdiction expanded further.
Section 49 deemed the existing High Court of Bombay to be the High Court for the new State, while section 51 laid down a threefold scheme dealing with the principal seat of the High Court, the establishment of permanent Benches, and the power to appoint additional places where Judges and Division Courts could sit.
The Nagpur Pact and Regional Expectations
An important political document underlying the dispute was the Nagpur Pact of 1953. This agreement was entered into by leaders of Marathi speaking regions before the States Reorganisation Commission.
Clause 7 of the pact assured that the arrangement regarding the establishment of a permanent Bench of the High Court at Nagpur would apply equally to the Marathwada region.
This assurance became a source of continuing expectation and later discontent when Marathwada did not receive a Bench even after the formation of Maharashtra in 1960.
Nagpur, which had earlier been the seat of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, was granted a permanent Bench of the Bombay High Court through section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960.
In contrast, despite repeated demands, Marathwada remained dependent on the principal seat at Bombay.
Over time, this led to practical difficulties for litigants and lawyers from the region, including increased cost, delay, and inconvenience in accessing justice.
Governmental Efforts to Establish a Bench at Aurangabad
By the late 1970s, the demand for a High Court Bench at Aurangabad had gained widespread support.
The Maharashtra Legislative Assembly passed a unanimous resolution in 1978 recommending the establishment of a permanent Bench of the Bombay High Court at Aurangabad for Marathwada.
The State Government forwarded this recommendation to the Central Government under section 51 subsection (2) of the States Reorganisation Act, which empowers the President to establish permanent Benches after consultation with the Governor and the Chief Justice.
While the proposal was under active consideration, it became evident that the Central Government would take time to formulate a general policy regarding permanent Benches of High Courts across the country.
In the meantime, the State Government had already made logistical preparations, including infrastructure and residential arrangements.
Faced with rising public expectations, the State Government proposed that, pending the establishment of a permanent Bench, recourse be taken to section 51 subsection (3).
Accordingly, on 27 August 1981, the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, with the prior approval of the Governor of Maharashtra, issued an order appointing Aurangabad as a place where Judges and Division Courts of the High Court would also sit.
Challenge Before the Bombay High Court
The validity of the Chief Justice’s order was challenged before the Bombay High Court by Narayan Shamrao Puranik and others. The petitioners raised multiple constitutional and statutory objections.
The principal argument was that the States Reorganisation Act was of a transitory nature and that powers under section 51 could not be exercised after a lapse of more than twenty five years.
It was also contended that after the bifurcation of the bilingual State of Bombay in 1960, Maharashtra could no longer be regarded as a new State within the meaning of section 51.
Another major objection was that the order under section 51 subsection (3) amounted to the establishment of a Bench and resulted in a territorial bifurcation of the High Court, something which, according to the petitioners, could only be done by the President under subsection (2) and not by the Chief Justice.
The High Court accepted these arguments and struck down the notification appointing Aurangabad as a place of sitting.
Issues Before the Supreme Court
On appeal by the State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide several significant legal questions.
The first issue concerned the nature of the States Reorganisation Act and whether powers under section 51 had become inoperative due to lapse of time.
The second issue related to the interpretation of the expression new State and its applicability to Maharashtra after 1960.
The third issue examined the scope of the Chief Justice’s power under section 51 subsection (3) and whether that power included authority to direct sittings at Aurangabad with full judicial functions.
Permanence of the States Reorganisation Act
The Supreme Court firmly rejected the view that the States Reorganisation Act was a temporary or transitory statute.
It held that the Act was a permanent piece of legislation enacted under constitutional authority and could not become obsolete merely because time had passed.
Relying on section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Court emphasised that when a statute confers a power, that power may be exercised from time to time unless a contrary intention appears.
The Court categorically stated that a statute can be abrogated only by express or implied repeal and cannot fall into desuetude or become inoperative by non use.
The assumption that section 51 had ebbed out due to lapse of time was described as legally untenable.
The Court also pointed out that Parliament itself had preserved the operation of section 51 through later legislation, including the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960.
Meaning of New State and Continued Applicability of Section 51
Addressing the argument that Maharashtra was no longer a new State, the Supreme Court analysed the statutory definition contained in section 2 of the States Reorganisation Act.
It held that the State of Bombay was undeniably a new State formed under Part II of the Act. The Bombay High Court was deemed to be the High Court for that new State, and its principal seat at Bombay was appointed under section 51.
The subsequent bifurcation of Bombay into Maharashtra and Gujarat did not extinguish the applicability of section 51 in relation to the Bombay High Court.
The Court attached significance to the fact that the Bombay Reorganisation Act made specific provision for the principal seat of the Gujarat High Court but made no corresponding provision for Bombay.
This indicated that Parliament intended the principal seat of the Bombay High Court and other matters to continue to be governed by section 51 of the 1956 Act.
Scope of the Chief Justice’s Power Under Section 51 Subsection (3)
One of the most important aspects of the judgment lies in the Court’s interpretation of section 51 subsection (3).
The Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between the establishment of a permanent Bench under subsection (2) and the appointment of additional places of sitting under subsection (3).
A permanent Bench established by the President involves territorial bifurcation and exclusive jurisdiction over specified districts.
In contrast, subsection (3) deals with the internal administration of the High Court and empowers the Chief Justice to arrange sittings of Judges and Division Courts at places other than the principal seat or permanent Bench.
The Court held that this power was inherent in the office of the Chief Justice and related to the allocation of judicial business. The non obstante clause in subsection (3) gave overriding effect to this authority.
Merely directing Judges to sit at Aurangabad did not create a separate High Court or territorially divide the existing one. Judges sitting at Aurangabad remained Judges of the Bombay High Court exercising the same jurisdiction.
Concept of Seat and Sittings of the High Court
The Supreme Court also clarified the conceptual distinction between the seat of a High Court and its sittings. It observed that it was impossible to conceive of Judges sitting at a place without that place being, in a real sense, a seat of the Court.
While the principal seat is the place where the High Court exercises all its powers in every capacity, the Court may have additional seats for the transaction of judicial business.
Drawing analogies from Article 130 of the Constitution relating to the Supreme Court and from historical provisions in the Letters Patent of Chartered High Courts, the Court affirmed that the power to sit at places other than the principal seat had long been recognised in Indian judicial administration.
Rejection of Colourable Exercise and Final Outcome
The Supreme Court dismissed the allegation that the Chief Justice’s order was a colourable exercise of power.
It found that the decision was taken bona fide, in consultation with the State Government, and with the approval of the Governor, to address genuine difficulties faced by litigants in the Marathwada region.
Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court, and upheld the validity of the notification dated 27 August 1981.
It directed that Judges and Division Courts of the Bombay High Court could sit at Aurangabad with full authority to entertain and dispose of cases arising from the Marathwada region.
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