The Supreme Court has set aside a Calcutta High Court judgment that allowed Jai Hind Private Limited to retain over 211 acres of agricultural land, holding that revenue authorities had no statutory power to review a concluded vesting order passed more than three decades earlier and that such a review violated settled principles governing quasi-judicial powers.
Case Details
- Case Title: State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Private Limited
- Court: Supreme Court of India
- Bench: Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
- Date of Judgment: 2026
- Citation: 2026 INSC 132
- Appeal From: Judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated 17 May 2012
Background of the Dispute
The litigation arose from claims made by Jai Hind Private Limited, a company incorporated in 1946, seeking to retain large tracts of agricultural land under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (WBEA Act).
The company had purchased about 205.57 acres of agricultural land prior to 1 January 1952 and additional land thereafter.
Following the coming into force of the WBEA Act, estates and intermediary rights vested in the State, subject to limited retention rights under Section 6.
The company claimed entitlement under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, which permits a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and “engaged exclusively in farming,” to retain agricultural land in its khas possession as on 1 January 1952.
A determination proceeding culminated in an order dated 7 October 1971 by the Revenue Officer, holding that the company failed to establish exclusive engagement in farming and was therefore not entitled to the benefit of Section 6(1)(j).
As a result, more than 200 acres vested in the State of West Bengal.
Judicial challenges to the 1971 vesting order failed. A writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution in 1975, a restoration application was rejected in 1987 for delay, and an appeal was dismissed in 2002. The vesting order thus attained finality.
Subsequent Proceedings
Decades later, during proceedings under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 relating to ceiling limits, the company approached the State Government seeking an “amicable settlement” and a review of the 1971 order, proposing to set up an eco-friendly agro-based industry.
In February 2008, the Land Reforms Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary issued a government order directing the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer (BL&LRO) to review the 1971 proceeding.
Acting on this direction, the BL&LRO passed a review order on 7 May 2008, setting aside the 1971 vesting decision and allowing the company to retain approximately 211.21 acres of land.
The West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal later quashed this review, holding that no power of review was vested in the revenue authority.
However, the Calcutta High Court reversed the Tribunal’s decision in 2012 and upheld the review order, prompting the State’s appeal to the Supreme Court.
Core Issues Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court examined two principal questions:
- Whether a Revenue Officer under the WBEA Act had statutory authority to review a concluded vesting order passed in 1971.
- Whether, even on merits, the company had fulfilled the statutory requirement of being “exclusively engaged in farming” as on 1 January 1952 to qualify for retention under Section 6(1)(j).
Court’s Analysis on Power of Review
The Court held that the power of review is not inherent and must be expressly conferred by statute. Revenue Officers and other authorities under Section 53 of the WBEA Act are executive or administrative authorities exercising limited quasi-judicial functions.
The Court reiterated settled law that such authorities “can exercise only those powers which are expressly conferred upon them by the statute.”
While the State had issued a 1958 notification under Section 57A of the WBEA Act investing Revenue Officers with powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court ruled that this general conferment did not include the substantive power of review.
It observed that “an omnibus investing of all powers of the Civil Court” cannot be read to include review unless the statute clearly so provides.
The Court further relied on the proviso to Section 57B(3) of the WBEA Act, which expressly prohibits a Revenue Officer from reopening matters already “enquired into, investigated, determined or decided” under the Act.
According to the Court, this statutory bar clearly indicated legislative intent against reopening concluded vesting determinations.
Separation of Powers and Quasi-Judicial Limits
In a detailed constitutional analysis, the Court underscored that conferring a power of review on executive authorities would undermine the doctrine of separation of powers and judicial independence, which form part of the Constitution’s basic structure.
Allowing an executive officer to sit in review over his own quasi-judicial order would erode finality and blur the distinction between executive and judicial functions.
The judgment cautioned that permitting such reviews would effectively convert administrative tribunals into regular courts, contrary to established tribunal jurisprudence.
The Court emphasised that review is “essentially a core judicial function” and cannot be exercised by executive authorities without explicit legislative sanction.
Findings on the Merits of the Review
Even assuming a power of review existed, the Court found that the 2008 review order failed to meet the limited grounds on which a review can be exercised.
Review, the Court noted, is not an appeal in disguise and cannot be used for re-appreciation of evidence or reconsideration of issues already decided.
The Court examined the 1971 vesting order and found no error apparent on the face of the record. It recorded that the company had been given repeated opportunities in 1971 to produce evidence demonstrating exclusive engagement in agricultural farming but failed to do so.
The Revenue Officer had specifically noted that mere ownership of agricultural land and payment of agricultural income tax did not establish that the company was not engaged in any other business.
The Supreme Court observed that even before it, the company could not point to material evidence proving exclusive agricultural engagement as on 1 January 1952. Documents relied upon during the 2008 review were either not new or had been available but not produced earlier.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that the 2008 review order was “wholly void and illegal” for want of jurisdiction and contrary to the statutory scheme of the WBEA Act.
It held that the Calcutta High Court erred in upholding the review and directing acceptance of land revenue from the company.
Accordingly, the appeal filed by the State of West Bengal was allowed, the High Court’s 2012 judgment was set aside, and the Tribunal’s order quashing the review was restored. The 1971 vesting order denying retention under Section 6(1)(j) was reaffirmed.
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